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ABSTRACT
We develop a means to detect ongoing per-country anomalies in
the daily usage metrics of the Tor anonymous communication
network, and demonstrate the applicability of this technique to
identifying likely periods of internet censorship and related events.
The presented approach identifies contiguous anomalous periods,
rather than daily spikes or drops, and allows anomalies to be ranked
according to deviation from expected behaviour.
The developed method is implemented as a running tool, with
outputs published daily by mailing list. This list highlights per-
country anomalous Tor usage, and produces a daily ranking of
countries according to the level of detected anomalous behaviour.
This list has been active since August 2016, and is in use by a number
of individuals, academics, and NGOs as an early warning system
for potential censorship events.
We focus on Tor, however the presented approach is more gen-
erally applicable to usage data of other services, both individually
and in combination. We demonstrate that combining multiple data
sources allows more specific identification of likely Tor blocking
events. We demonstrate the our approach in comparison to exist-
ing anomaly detection tools, and against both known historical
internet censorship events and synthetic datasets. Finally, we detail
a number of significant recent anomalous events and behaviours
identified by our tool.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Network measurement; • Social and profes-
sional topics → Technology and censorship; • Security and
privacy→ Pseudonymity, anonymity and untraceability;
KEYWORDS
information controls, censorship, filtering, anomaly detection
1 INTRODUCTION
Nation states, and others, increasingly employ internet filtering
as a means of controlling access to information, and as a tool to
limit social and political organisation. Given the central role that
the internet plays in communications for a large proportion of the
global population, understanding the application and development
of filtering technologies, and the effects of these methods on individ-
uals and society, is of great importance. Whilst analyses of known
filtering regimes allow us to identify tools, techniques, and limita-
tions of filtering approaches, we consider that discovering internet
filtering behaviour in less-studied regions is of great importance.
Much existing research into internet filtering has focused either
on observing practices of states already known engage in filtering,
or in the development of censorship circumvention tools. Whilst
multilateral studies of censorship have been conducted, most no-
tably the seminal work of Deibert et al. [11], these approaches have
typically amalgamated manual country-specific investigations. In
the case of Deibert et al., countries were hand-ranked according to
a number of broad criteria for internet freedom, based on network
measurements as well as media reporting and expert interviews.
The work presented here provides a means to alert researchers
and activists to developing events that may otherwise have been
missed by focusing on patterns of circumvention tool usage around
the world. As an initial step our tool currently reports new anom-
alies and a current ranking ofmost anomalous countries to amailing
list on a daily basis. The <infolabe-anomalies> mailing list has
been running publicly since August 2016, has subscribers from
academia and civil society organisations, and has provided the first
known detection of a number of significant ongoing Tor-related
blocking events that we detail in §7.
1.1 Contributions
This work presents a theoretical contribution to network anomaly
detection, a practical contribution in the form of an implemented
tool for detecting anomalous events in Tor usage data, a resource
in the form of a public dataset of detected anomalies in historical
Tor traffic, and a practical analysis demonstrating the detection of
real-world events: we identify known, previously unreported, and
newly-detected filtering-related events.
We make the following practical contributions:
• An open tool to detect and highlight anomalies in per-country
usage of the Tor network;
• a continually-updated daily ranking of the most anomalous
countries in terms of their usage of Tor.
These are built on our key methodological contribution:
• An approach for detecting and quantifying anomalous peri-
ods of per-country Tor usage incorporating multiple usage
measurements.
We validate the effectiveness of our approach in detecting both
a range of artificial anomalies, and known reported filtering events
against the Tor network. We also demonstrate our approach’s im-
proved detection accuracy compared to the existing Tor metrics
anomaly detector, as well showing its additional capabilities in
terms of identifying anomalous periods and ranking anomalies by
strength.
1.2 Problem and Approach
When an entity, such as a state or ISP, chooses to filter or block
certain types of information, the resulting patterns of traffic reflect
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the intervention in the form of statistical anomalies. In a global
system, in which many entities may be interfering with traffic or
publicising their attempts to do so, it is desirable to identify localised
anomalies and to gain an understanding of their nature.
To detect anomlies, we model each country’s Tor usage relative
to the behaviour of other countries, not as an individual time series.
A given country’s usage pattern is judged as anomalous if it deviates
from its previous behaviour relative to other countries.
The usage patterns of a tool such as Tor, explicitly developed
and publicised as a means for bypassing network censorship, are
affected by a range of factors such as filtering, social and political
unrest, unrelated network outages, and media reporting [4]. The
work presented here therefore identifies statistical anomalies in Tor
usage metrics, but we highlight that such anomalies serve as an
indicator, not a proof, of censorship or interference.
In later sections we make use of both standard Tor traffic and
blocking-resistant bridge node traffic to identify direct blocking of
Tor. Combining anomalies across metrics allows identification of
declines in normal usage combined with rises in blocking-resistant
bridge usage. This corresponds to users being unable to access Tor
normally, and so switching to blocking resistant approaches. As
we demonstrate in §7, this provides a targeted identification of
filtering-related anomalies.
We extend a line of research initially proposed by Jackson and
Mudholkar [18] for application in industrial process control, and
later employed by Lakhina et al. [22] to detect network-wide traffic
anomalies from per-link data in high-performance networks. Our
approach differs from that of [22] in a number of ways. Firstly, we do
not assume that the underlying set of time series are stationary, but
instead allow for series to evolve over time. Secondly, we account for
seasonality in time series. Most importantly, however, we identify
per-country anomalies rather than global. Finally, we dynamically
adapt our anomaly thresholds for each series to account for long-
term evolution of the data.
We directly apply our tool to analysis of Tor usage anomalies,
and report on its demonstrated utility for detecting anomalies of
practical concern to activists and NGOs working to support cen-
sorship circumvention and freedom of expression. A number of
such actors subscribe to our public mailing list, and have used our
detection results to identify newly-emerging filtering behaviours.
2 EXISTINGWORK
Internet filtering has received attention from various fields. Tech-
nical research has focused on mechanisms of censorship and the
development of circumvention approaches. The social sciences have
investigated motivations of censors, and their legal, economic, and
societal effects.
2.1 Technical Analysis
Arguably the most well-known national-level filtering system is
that of China, commonly known as the Great Firewall. One of the
earliest significant studies of this system was presented by Clay-
ton et al.[5], who isolated one mechanism by which connections
were interrupted if particular keywords were identified in traffic.
The mechanism discovered by Clayton et al. resulted in TCP RST
packets being sent from an intermediary router to both source and
destination of a connection if a filtering criterion was met. The
authors further demonstrated that if the two endpoints of the con-
nection ignored the TCP RST, the connection could successfully
continue.
In more recent work, it has become apparent that the Chinese
approach to filtering is both complex and evolving. In two recent
papers, a group of anonymous researchers have explored manipu-
lation, or poisoning, of DNS records that pass through China [2, 3].
This work has identified DNS manipulation as one of the most
prevalent forms of filtering in China. Similarly, Wright [37] demon-
strated that DNS censorship had different effects between different
regions within China, with significant variation in the nature of
the DNS poisoning seen across the country. Similarly, Farnan et al.
[14] showed that the approach taken to DNS poisoning in China
resulted in pollution of both network requests and DNS servers
themselves.
Crandall et al.[7] make use of latent semantic analysis to derive,
from known terms blocked in HTTP traffic going into China, seman-
tically related keywords that might also be blocked. These derived
keywords can then be verified by the simple process of attempting to
make HTTP connections into China containing the suspect words.
This approach aims to produce a continually-updated list of blocked
terms that could be used to maintain an understanding of those
terms most offensive to the filtering authorities. Similarly, Darer et
al. [9, 10] have used keyword- and crawling-based approaches to
discover previously unindentified blocked domains.
2.2 Global Studies
Perhaps the most comprehensive study to date of global filtering
practices is given by Deibert et al. [11]. In this work the authors
carried out a range of remote and in-country analyses over a number
of years, incorporating both technical measurements and interviews
with local experts. The resulting research presented a series of
snapshots of individual countries, with both an overview of the
social, political, and technical landscape, and censorship practices
rated on a simple scale in various categories of content: political,
social, conflict and security, and internet tools.
Some forms of filtering act not at the network layer, but on appli-
cation level or social filtering. King et al. [21] studied manual cen-
sorship practices in Chinese long-form blogging, and demonstrated
that the Chinese censorship authorities were chiefly concerned
with preventing calls to collective action whilst allowing significant
levels of government criticism.
2.3 Anomaly Detection
The Tor project maintain a censorship flagging tool, as described
by Danezis[8]. This tool uses a particle-filtering approach to model
the ratio of daily connections for each country in a seven-day time
period. If a country’s ratio of current to past users increases or
decreases significantly more than the average of the fifty largest
Tor-using countries, then an anomaly is flagged. These reported
anomalies are available at the Tor Project’s metrics portal [29]. We
evaluate our approach’s accuracy against that of Danezis in §6.
A related approach was used by Lakhina et al. [22] to identify
network-wide anomalies in high-speed networks. This work as-
sumed that long-term network usage was stable, and made use of
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data gathered from a restricted set of link-level observation points
to detect network-wide anomalies. Our approach relaxes both of
these assumptions, neither of which hold for the Tor metrics data.
These extensions are discussed in greater detail in §4.1.2.
Several other works have extended or expanded aspects of [22],
notably [34], [39], and [16]. These largely focus, however, on using
a small number of network observation points to infer network-
wide anomalies, and as such typically begin from relatively low-
dimensional data. Our approach inverts this concept by detecting
per-observation anomalies across a dataset with several hundred
dimensions, representing individual countries’ usage, in order to
highlight states displaying anomalous behaviour.
3 CONCEPTS
In this section we discuss the fundamental techniques underlying
our approach, and discuss their application to the dataset we use in
the rest of this work.
3.1 Tor
Tor [12] is an approach to anonymous web-browsing that offers
realistic compromises between latency, usability, and the strength
of the anonymity properties that it provides. The most visible end-
user aspect of Tor is the Tor Browser Bundle, which provides a
web-browser that both uses the Tor network for transport, and is
tailored to reduce identifiability of end users.
Managed by the Tor Project, Tor has developed into a global net-
work of volunteer-run relays that forward traffic on behalf of other
users. The network makes use of an onion routing approach that
build encrypted circuits between relays, preventing most realistic
adversaries from linking Tor users to particular streams of traffic
exiting the network.
The most sigificant aspect of the Tor network for the present
work is that, by its nature, users’ traffic is relayed via third parties.
As such, and in addition to its anonymity properties, Tor provides
a means to bypass many forms of internet filtering. Censorship
circumvention is a core aspect of the Tor Project’s goals, and sig-
nificant ongoing research work[26, 33, 36] is aimed at ensuring
that Tor is resilient against attacks and continues to offer means to
evade national-level filters.
While the extent and popularity of Tor’s use in regions that
experience significant levels of filtering, such as China, is open to
debate [32], Tor is known to have been blocked actively by a number
of states, including China and Iran, that object to its use to bypass
local internet restrictions and to act anonymously. Significantly,
Tor is also arguably the highest-profile censorship circumvention
tool at the international level and has received significant media
coverage, making it one of the tools of choice for internet activists.
3.1.1 Tor Metrics Data. Tor’s role as a high-profile censorship
circumvention network make it a useful indicator of global filtering
practices. To support analysis of the tool, the Tor project provide
estimated daily per-country usage statistics, gathered by counting
the number of client requests to central directory authorities on a
daily basis.
It is assumed that each client, on average, will make ten requests
per day, and as such the aggregate user statistics are divided by ten
to provide a final estimate of usage. This data is averaged across
each 24-hour period to provide the average number of concurrently
connected Tor clients for that day[30]. Whilst the number of dis-
tinct clients per day cannot be estimated with any accuracy, the
methodology of the Tor metrics portal provides a sufficiently stable
estimate.
From these estimates we obtain a set of 251 time series repre-
senting individual countries according to the GeoIP database used
by Tor. These time series comprise daily observations ranging from
the beginning of September 2011 to the time of writing. From these,
we remove those countries whose Tor usage never rises above 100
users to discount countries whose variance is too high to allow
meaningful anomaly detection.
In later sections, we combine normal usage trends in Tor with
censorship-resistant bridge node usage to identify correlated anom-
alies. This is discussed in further detail in §4.4.
3.2 Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis was developed by Pearson[27] as
a means to produce tractable low-dimensional approximations of
high-dimensional datasets. The original set of variables, which may
display correlations, are transformed to a set of linearly uncorre-
lated variables know as principal components.
When data displays a high degree of correlation between vari-
ables then a small number of the most significant principal compo-
nents may be sufficient to describe the original data to a high degree
of accuracy. In many practical scenarios, high dimensional data
can be described using only two or three of the most significant
principal components. See [19] for a detailed treatment of principal
component analysis and the various choices and compromises to
be made when applying the technique.
The practical result of this is that our results are not influenced
by countries with large usage numbers; the principal component
analysis considers variance, not magnitude, in calculating the con-
tribution of each country to the model.
4 APPROACH
The basic operation of our approach are described here, and are
given as pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
4.1 Overview
Starting from Tor’s per-country usage data, we initially remove all
countries whose usage never rises above 100 users, to avoid the
unacceptably high variance in such data. We then apply the STL
algorithm to identify and remove any seasonality – in our case
weekly trends – in individual countries.
For each 180-day period in the dataset we apply a principal
component analysis over the usage time series for all countries,
resulting in a set of components for that time window. Taking
the true observed usage for each country for the final day of each
window, we calculate the approximated value from the first 12
principal components. This provides the expected value for each
country based on previous behaviour1.
1Using the full set of principal components at this stage would result in a perfect
reconstruction of the original observed values.
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1 PCATagAnomaly
input :usage← Set of per-country time series
output :anomalies← Set of per-country anomaly time
series
2 (Clean data; remove seasonality)
3 medians ← {median residual errors for each country}
4 mads ← {median absolute deviations (MADs) of residual
errors for each country}
5 foreach day in usage do
6 pc ← calculate principal components over all
countries’ usage[(day-179):day]
7 foreach country do
8 recons ← reconstruct day value for country using
pc[1 : 12]
9 obsv ← observed value for final day for country
10 err ← abs( obsv - recons ).
11 medianscountry ← update median using err
12 madscountry ← update MADs using
medianscountry and err
13 if abs(err ) > abs(madscountry × 2.5 ) then
14 anomaliescountry×day ← 1
15 end
16 else
17 anomaliescountry×day ← 0
18 end
19 end
20 end
Algorithm 1: Basic anomaly tagging algorithm. (Anomaly mag-
nitudes omitted for brevity.)
For each country we calculate the difference between the true
value and the reconstructed value, providing a residual error that
was not captured by the restricted set of principal components.
We maintain a rolling calculation of both the median observed
residual error and the median absolute deviation of the errors for
each country. We mark a day as anomalous if the observed resid-
ual error falls outside of 2.5 median absolute deviations from the
median.
We now detail the individual steps listed above, and justify our
choices of parameters.
4.1.1 Removal of Seasonality. Per-country Tor usage data, as
with much network usage data, exhibits significant seasonality,
typically on a weekly basis, reflecting changes between usage on
weekdays and at weekends. This continual cyclical change in usage
can reduce the accuracy of principal component analysis due to
varying levels of seasonality exhibited by different countries.
We employ the Seasonal and Trend Decomposition using Loess
(STL) method of Cleveland et al. [6] to remove the seasonal compo-
nent of each series, leaving the trend component and the residual
noise as inputs to our anomaly detector. In later sections, however,
we show the original data with seasonality restored.
4.1.2 Rolling Analysis. Principal component analysis does not
account for ordering in observations, and as such cannot account
for evolution of a dataset according to trends or seasonablity. To
account for developing patterns, therefore, we perform a rolling
principal component analysis over smaller time windows within
the series. For the purposes of our experiments, we make use of
a 180-day window as a balance between sufficient data for useful
principal component analysis, given the number of dimension in
the data, against the evolution of the daily Tor metrics. See Ringberg
et al. [31] for a discussion of the sensitivity of PCA to such factors.
4.1.3 Selection of Components. For PCA, the full set of principal
components allows reconstruction of the full data set. As fewer
components are selected, less variance in the original dataset is
captured. A common approach to selecting an appropriate number
of components for modelling is to make use of Kaiser’s criterion [20]
to select only those principal components with eigenvalue greater
than 1, representing those components that provide more infor-
mation than a single average component. Based on this heuristic,
our experimental results suggest twelve principal components as
broadly optimal across the dataset.
With appropriately calculated principal components, we can
reconstruct an approximate value for each day’s Tor usage based
on previous behaviour. We highlight that at no point do we pre-
dict forecasted values for usage in future days. In each case, we
reconstruct a day’s usage based on principal components in order
to compare against the true observed value, and thus to calculate
deviance from prior behaviour relative to other countries.
4.2 Calculation of Residuals
After reconstructing data from principal components, the result is
a set of residuals that express variances in the observed data not
captured by the current principal component model. A sufficiently
large-scale residual represents behaviour that deviates significantly
from previous patterns, and is thus of interest.
4.3 Identifying Anomalies through Residuals
The residual errors calculated during the reconstruction accounts
for variance in the dataset that is not expressed by the chosen
principle components in the approximate model.
• Positive residuals represent drops in expected Tor usage for
a country.
• Negative residuals represent increases in expected Tor usage
for a country.
• Magnitude of residuals expresses howmuch a country varies
from its previous behaviour relative to other countries.
A key advantage of identifying anomalies from residual errors
rather than raw usage numbers is that it incorporates the expected
trend of the data. This identifies anomalous periods even when no
visible shift in usage is seen: a flat usage trendwhere the expectation
is a rise or fall is correctly identified as anomalous by our approach.
This capacity to identify anomalies in apparently typical usage is an
important and unusual aspect of our technique, taking advantage
of the relative patterns of usage between countries.
A second advantage of this approach is that each day can be
judged as anomalous or not based on a model of behaviour relative
to other countries. As such, in contrast to many other anomaly
detection approaches, we identify periods of anomalous behaviour
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in which a country may be experiencing ongoing elevated or re-
duced usage. Other approaches typically flag an individual day
as a significant spike or drop, but cannot identify ongoing peri-
ods as anomalous. This capability greatly aids our ability to study
time-bounded changes in Tor usage.
4.4 Combining Features to Identify Targeted
Filtering
It is fundamental to the broader goals of this work that usage anom-
alies in appropriately selected traffic, and in particular from circum-
vention tools, can be indicative of the imposition or relaxation of
filtering. At the same time, it is clear that other types of event, both
technical and sociopolitical, can lead to shifting patterns of usage
in these tools.
We aim to identify two forms of event: firstly, direct blocking
of the Tor network; secondly, changing characteristics of Tor us-
age in response to exogenous factors. The censorship of a major
international website, such as YouTube, has the potential to drive
a noticeable number of users to Tor, and as such Tor becomes a
useful proxy variable [35] for a broader class of filtering behaviour.
We discuss this in relation to specific events in §7.
For the first of these classes of event, we detect likely candi-
dates by carrying out anomaly detection on multiple metrics and
combining outputs to highlight periods in which anomalies were
detected in more than one series. The most useful of these for
our purposes is to combine negative trends in standard Tor usage
with positive trends in blocking-resistant bridge node usage, re-
flecting users unable to access Tor normally switching to the tool’s
blocking-resistant mode.
As suchwe can identify days inwhich both standard and blocking-
resistant time series were anomalous. Even without refinements,
such as allowing time lags between anomalies in each series, this
approach already highlight a number of significant cases, which
are illustrated in §7.
4.5 Expected Error and Anomalous Threshold
A key element in the approach presented in this work is to deter-
mine an appropriate threshold for events to be considered anoma-
lous. The size of this threshold value is inherently linked to the
expected error in the technique. We here discuss and justify our
approach to calculating this threshold, making use of robust statis-
tics[17] to minimise false detection rates.
A naïve anomalous threshold can be defined as a proportion
of the usage for that day. If the reconstructed value deviates by
more than some percentage of the observed value, an anomaly is
detected.
This approach is problematic. Critically, different countries may
be modelled more or less accurately than others. As such, countries
that are typically modelled poorly would produce a high proportion
of anomalous periods.
As such, we calculate an ongoing threshold based on the charac-
teristics of each country. By tracking the expected residual value for
each country an expected anomalous threshold can be determined
based on typical observed errors.
The standard approach of basing this threshold on the mean
and standard deviations are, however, not robust against outliers
Figure 1: Ten most anomalous countries according to me-
dian absolute deviation of residuals over the previous year.
Grey areas highlight detected anomalous periods.
in the dataset due to their assumption that errors are Gaussian.
We therefore calculate thresholds based on the median absolute
deviation about the median (MAD) to define the expected error in
normal usage [24].
The median is robust against outliers in the dataset; a small num-
ber of extreme events do not significantly alter its value. Similarly,
by taking the median of the absolute deviations about the median
as a measure of the statistical dispersion in the dataset, we avoid
anomalies from overly affecting the remaining data points.
As a default, we consider events as anomalous if they fall out-
side of 2.5 median absolute deviations2 from the rolling median
value. See [24] for a discussion of the robustness of the median and
MAD against outliers, and a justification of a 2.5 median absolute
deviation threshold.
4.6 Ranking of Countries
The size of the residual error from the principal componenet anal-
ysis provides a convenient metric by which to rank countries ac-
cording to the level of anomalous behaviour that they exhibit in a
given time period. We make use of the size of the median absolute
deviation about the median to rank countries, as shown in Figure 1.
We now proceed to discuss the application of our technique, and
the validation of the approach.
In §6 we evaluate our approach against synthetically injected
anomalies in the data to analyse the effectiveness of our detection
methods as the magnitude and severity of the anomalies vary. We
2Corresponding to roughly one expected false positive every 80 days. See §6 for an
experimental analysis of false positives in our approach.
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also compare our detection mechanism against the small number
of verified reported blocking events against the Tor network.
Finally, in §7 we conduct a series of analyses of the Tor met-
rics data to identify anomalous countries and specific periods of
anomalous behaviour.
5 ETHICS
Conducting research into network filtering presents a number of
ethical issues [38]. The most significant of these is that approaches
to investigating network filtering may require direct access to fil-
tered networks. In practice this often involves the participation of
in-country experts to conduct local network tests.
Due to the uncertain legal, or quasi-legal, status of violating or
investigating state-level network filters, it is generally impossible to
quantify the risks to research participants in carrying out network
tests. The classic models of informed consent used in many other
fields of research can be difficult to apply for a number of reasons,
the most important of which is the lack of meaningful informed
consent afforded by automated testing on behalf of users, and the
legal uncertainty surrounding attempted access to filtered resources
on a test subject’s network connection.
We therefore assert that, where possible, research into network
filtering should make use of passive measurements and existing
available data sources. The work in this paper is a deliberate attempt
to maximise the effectiveness of such a passive approach.
6 VALIDATION
In this section, we judge the efficacy of our method in terms of its
ability to detect anomalies, in a variety of circumstances, as well as
its false classification rate.
A significant dificulty in validating unsupervised machine learn-
ing systems is that it is largely impossible to obtain comprehensive
ground truth for internet filtering events, nor are there publicly-
available exhaustive lists of filtering events. Indeed, the work here
was motivated partially in an attempt to allow a more exhaustive
tracking of such events. Filtering is, by and large, an opaque pro-
cess that is rarely announced. Even when states do choose to filter
connections openly, the details of that filtering are not typically
made public.
As observed in [15], this is an inherent problem in unsupervised
anomaly detection algorithms. In the the following sections we
address this lack by injecting artificial anomalies into a synthetic
dataset and comparing this to the Tor Project’s existing anomaly
detection approach, as well as evaluating our method against an
existing list of known filtering events.
In the following, we examine both false positive and false neg-
ative rates in evaluating detection rates of anomalous behaviour.
A false positive in this context is a period in which there is no
genuinely anomalous activity, but anomalous activity is reported.
A false negative is a period in which there is anomalous activity
but is is not detected.
6.1 Evaluation in Synthetic Data
To test our approach, and to create a fair comparison against the
existing deployed tool from the Tor Project, we inject artificial
anomalies into synthetic data generated according to underlying
features of real-world Tor usage.
An alternative test for false negatives is to compare the results
from our approach with an external list of known censorship events.
This allows us to test whether periods exist in which we did not
detect anomalous behaviour during a period where external sources
believe an event occurred. We take this approach in §6.5.
6.2 Generating Synthetic Data
To evaluate our approach against an approximation of real-world
data, we use the underlying features of genuine observed Tor data
to generate a synthetic set of time series.
To do so, we select a year-long period of Tor data in which no
major global events can be observed. This was to avoid an unfair
basis for comparison between our approach and that of the Danezis.
As such, we selected the year running from the 1st January 2014 to
the 31st December 2014.
To remove, as far as possible, genuine anomalies from this dataset
we first decompose the series into trend, seasonal, and residual
components through use of the STL algorithm [6]. This allowed
us to preserve seasonal properties of the data separately from the
underlying trend. We emphasise that, whilst STL is also used in our
anomaly detection approach, the application of it here preserves,
rather than removes, the underlying features of the data and thus
is not unfairly biasing the synthetic dataset towards our approach.
The underlying trend data is then smoothed using a 28-day
rolling median average. Due to the robust nature of the median
against small outliers, this approach preserves broad-scale trends in
the data whilst removing, as far as possible, small-scale deviations.
Without an objective labelled set of anomalies we cannot guarantee
that no anomalies were preserved in the final dataset, but a visual
inspection did not reveal any significant causes for concern.
We then calculate, for each country, the mean and the standard
deviation of the residual errors after the trend and seasonal compo-
nents have been removed. This gives a base set of parameters from
which to generate random noise to be added to each series.
To create the final synthetic dataset, we recombine the smoothed
underlying trend data with the seasonal component and add ran-
domised noise. As it is impossible to characterise the “true” noise
process without having labelled anomalies we conservatively add
Gaussian noise drawn according to the observed mean and standard
deviation. This provides a “clean” dataset without anomalies, based
on real-world patterns of behaviour.
6.3 Injecting Anomalies
As with the underlying data, we generate anomalies based on prop-
erties observed in real-world data. The strength of the injected
anomalies is based on the average daily users for each country, and
magnified upwards or downwards gradually to create the anomaly.
To create an anomaly, the number of users in each set was in-
creased or decreased by 0–100%. Anomalies are added to the data
gradually, ranging over periods from one to four weeks. These pa-
rameters were selected based on observation of known anomalies
and visual inspection of the original dataset.
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In total, for the year of synthetic data, we injected a total of 250
anomalies across all countries, randomly drawn from the space of
possible parameters.
This synthetic, labelled dataset provides the basis both for ob-
jective evaluation of the effectiveness of our technique, and as an
unbiased means of comparison between our approach and that of
[8]. We now evaluate the effectiveness of these two approaches.
6.4 Comparison of Tools
An evaluation of false positive and false negative rates in detecting
anomalous periods allows both an objective judgement on the ef-
fectiveness of our approach, and a comparison against the existing
tool used by the Tor Project [8]. To carry out this comparison, we
formatted the clean synthetic dataset appropriately for each tool
and compared the detected anomaly series from each to the injected
set of anomalies.
One problematic element of such a comparison is in the nature of
event reporting from each tool. As mentioned, our approach reports
day-by-day anomalies based on principal component modelling. By
comparison, [8] bases its detection on significant spikes and dips
on a day-by-day basis. As such, it is far less likely that Tor Project’s
existing tool will report anomalous periods, but will instead detect
only the points at at which an anomaly starts and ends. This should
hypothetically result in a much higher detection accuracy rate for
our tool on a day-by-day comparison: an anomaly that lasts for
ten days will typically only produce two anomalously flagged days
in the Tor Project’s detection scheme, whereas it may result in
ten days for our tool as each day in the anomalous period may be
identified. By contrast, however, our tool’s approach leaves us open
to a potentially higher false negative rate when a period is falsely
judged to be anomalous.
We highlight again, however, that this period-based rather than
event-based approach is one of the key strengths of our improved
approach – we report entire periods as anomalous rather than
simply identifying point anomalies.
As such, to compare, we perform a simple analysis: the output of
each tool is evaluated according to the ground truth in the labelled
synthetic dataset. Days correctly identified as anomalous contribute
to the true positive rate, whilst days marked as anomalous that
are not in the synthetic data contribute to the false positive rate.
Similarly, if a day is anomalous in the synthetic data and missed
by our tool, it contributes to the false negative rate, whilst days
correctly identified as not anomalous contribute to the true negative
rate. These values are reported in Table 1.
Our principal component-based approach significantly outper-
forms the currently deployed Tor Metrics detector both in marking
genuine anomalies and in avoiding marking non-anomalous days
incorrectly.
The overall detection rate of our approach is over twice that of
the alternative, at 20% of all genuinely anomalous days being iden-
tified. This figure is somewhat misleadingly low, however, as this
includes many correctly-identified anomalous periods for which,
however, some individual days were not themselves considered
anomalous.
Tor Metrics Principal Component
True Positives 8.57% 20.08%
True Negatives 92.75% 94.25%
False Positives 7.25% 5.75%
False Negatives 91.43% 79.92%
Total Days Flagged 2962 2820
Minimal Detection Total1 88 139
Total anomalous days across entire set was 4214.
1 Anomalies during which at least one day was identified.
Table 1: Comparison between Tor Metrics and Principal
Component approach on synthetic data.
These results suggest that in realistic data generated from ob-
served real-world trends, the proposed principal component analysis-
based approach significantly outperforms the existing deployed
tool.
6.4.1 Ranking. We have attempted, as far as possible, to under-
take a fair comparison of the quantitatively comparable elements
of these two approaches, despite significant differences in their
output. In addition, however, our approach offers a number of ad-
vantages for analysis. The most significant of these is the ability
to rank countries according to the strength of the anomalies they
have demonstrated over time in terms of deviation from expected
behaviour. The infolabe-anomalies mailing list reports daily the
top-ranking anomalous countries for the previous day, week, and
month in addition to a list of all countries anomalous for that day.
It is worth highlighting that whilst realtime detection is of great
interest to the commmunity, the ability to study historical anomalies
in the Tor metrics dataset is also of significant value.
6.5 Detection of Known Events
Having calculated anomalous statistics over a synthetic data set, we
now aim to validate our approach by comparing anomalies detected
in real data against countries and periods in which internet restric-
tions are known to have been applied, or in which significant events
were occurring that may have influenced usage of circumvention
tools.
For this purpose we use [1], a list of reported and verified filtering
events against the Tor network dating from 2008 to 2015. This list
includes a brief description of each reported event, the dates when
the event was first reported, and how the blocking was resolved.
The list of events used in this evaluation[1]was compiled through
bug reports, talks, examination of blog postings, and the use of ma-
chine learning on blog postings to identify reports of censorship
automatically. As such, the exact timing of the events is somewhat
fuzzy; a blocking event against Tor could have occurred some time
before bug reports and blog postings were filed.
In addition, [1] is unfortunately brief, reflecting a significant lack
of data available concerning this topic. As discussed, a motivation
for this work is to provide a baseline of reliable indicators to allow
for potentially censorship-related anomalies to be identified and
investigated more thoroughly.
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Date Country Description of Event
2012-10-18 Iran TLS key exchange DPI1.
2012-12-16 Syria DPI on TLS renegotiation.
2013-01-30 Japan Bridge blocked.
2013-03-09 Iran SSL handshake filtered.
2013-03-26 China Probing obfs2 bridges.
2014-03-28 Turkey Tor website blocked.
2014-07-29 Iran Block directory authorities.
2015-02-01 China Obfs4 bridges blocked.
1 See §6.5 for a discussion of this particular anomaly.
Table 2: Complete list of reported, and detected, Tor block-
ing events.
The Tor Project’s metrics data does not cover the full time range
of the events listed in [1]. For those events that do fall within the
available data, we analyse here whether these would be detected
by our approach.
As shown in Table 2, only eight reported events coincide with
the available published metrics data. Of these, our approach suc-
cessfully classifies all events as anomalous3. In all cases except the
Iranian DPI filtering on TLS that occurred in 2012, our anomalies
coincide with the reported event from [1]. In the case of Iran in
2012, we detect an anomalous period beginning two weeks before
the reported event, corresponding to an immediate sharp fall in
Tor usage, followed by a longer period of slow decline over the
following month.
6.6 Recent Events
We have, in the course of investigating Tor metrics data with the
tool detailed in this work, discovered and reported a number of sig-
nificant Tor usage anomalies in countries including Ukraine, Israel,
Bangladesh, UAE, and Turkmenistan. In some of these cases anom-
alies are due to filtering behaviour, such as Bangladesh’s blocking
of Facebook and chat applications in November 2015. In other cases
the anomalies are due to external factors such as Ukraine’s block-
ing of the popular Russian social networking site VKontakte in
May 2017 [25] that led to a large spike in circumvention tool usage.
Numerous other events have been detected, but space limitations
prevent significant discussion of individual cases.
7 EXAMPLE RESULTS
Due to space constraints, we will not discuss specific cases in detail.
This section shows a number of example outputs that highlight
detected anomalies. As far as possible, we have extended the range
of time shown in each plot to highlight that detected anomalies are
not a frequent occurrence.
7.1 Most Anomalous Countries
Figure 1 illustrates the ten most anomalous countries according to
their median absolute deviation from the median in the past year.
3Two events corresponded to direct blocking of Tor bridge nodes, and these were
identified as anomalous in the bridge usage statistics. All other anomalies were detected
in normal Tor usage.
Figure 2: Combined relay and bridge Tor usage anomalies.
Shaded regions denote periods of anomalous usage, according to
our tool.
7.2 Combined Tor Metric Anomalies
Figure 2 highlights example combined anomalies that demonstrate
periods in which Tor usage via normal relays and access via bridge
nodes experienced simultaneous but opposing anomalies.
Over the period included in the available Tor metrics data, which
covers late 2011 until the time of writing, our technique identified
485 anomalous periods in which both Tor usage and bridge usage
were jointly anomalous, across 102 countries out of the total 251
for which Tor assigns usage statistics. This number is somewhat
inflated due to the fact that a number of these anomalous periods
are separated only by a small number of days and are likely the
result of the same event.
Of these countries, Georgia had the highest number of combined
detected anomalies, with 16 anomalous periods identified since
2011. The median number of anomalous periods over the set of
all 102 countries that showed any anomalous behaviour was four.
It is possible that this number may increase if the combination
of anomalous periods is made more flexible, as discussed in §4.4,
however this demonstrates that events that exceed the threshold
for combined anomalies are relatively rare.
7.3 Ukraine Russian Service Ban
In early May 2017 the Ukrainian government blocked a number
of major Russian online services, used by a significant number
of Ukrainian citizens, including social network sites VKontakte
and Odnoklassniki, mail provider mail.ru, and Yandex, a major
search engine[25]. Figure 3 shows a strong surge in Tor usage in
the immediate aftermath of this, causing Ukraine to rise to the top
of the daily anomaly rankings on the <name-redacted> mailing
list. This example represents a significant anomaly in Tor usage
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Figure 3: Anomalous usage following Ukraine’s ban on ma-
jor Russian network services.
related to blocking of standard internet services beyond Tor, and is
in direct comparison to the Turkmenistan example of Figure 2 that
highlights blocking of the Tor network itself.
8 DISCUSSION
The validation and results of §6 and §7 demonstrate that our ap-
proach is practically useful for identifying both Tor blocking and,
more generally, for identifying periods of anomalous Tor usage. The
highlighted anomalies detected by our approach are strong indica-
tors of regions of likely interest to the internet filtering research
and activist communities, and in particular in the combination of
normal Tor and bridge node usage.
More directly, the experimental validation in the previous section
demonstrates that our approach does detect a significant number
of anomalies with varying magnitudes and durations.
9 FUTUREWORK
A main aspect of future work, for which these techniques were de-
veloped, will be to perform analysis on historical filtering behaviour
and to maintain an ongoing watch for new potential filtering events.
By combination with datasets such as Google’s Global Database of
Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) [23], and through collabo-
ration with researchers and activists, the authors hope to develop
and maintain a contextualised time series of per-country filtering
events for the benefit of future researchers.
Whilst the work presented here has focused on the application
of our technique to Tor metrics data, the method is more generally
applicable. Applying the techniques presented here to other data
sources is the most obvious direct extension to this work. We have
made preliminary analyses based on data from Psiphon, CAIDA,
Measurement Lab [13], and the Wikimedia Foundation, as well as
evaluating data from the OONI Project [28] for its applicability in
detecting filtering. Other data sources, such as social media, are
also likely candidates for analysis.
Given the results of combining multiple Tor metrics, an interest-
ing line of enquiry would be to investigate the speed with which
users respond to filtering of Tor by adopting bridge nodes, and to
understand the proportion of users that make this change. As more
data sources are combined, further analysis of filtering’s effects in
different countries and under different conditions becomes possible.
10 CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a principal component analysis-based multi-
variate anomaly detection system to detect anomalous periods in
per-country usage statistics of Tor metrics data. Our approach al-
lows detection of per-country anomalies in time series that are
non-stationary and that demonstrate significant seasonality. Our
approach discounts global trends and even large-scale global events
by considering individual countries’ usage patterns as relative to
that of others.
We have demonstrated the application of this tool to data from
the Tor Project’s metrics portal, showing that it provides a means
to indicate potential censorship-related events, and others, at the
global level. We have further shown that combining multiple met-
rics to identify jointly-anomalous periods can greatly improve the
usefulness of the detected anomalies for identifying periods of
direct blocking of Tor.
This work presents a generally applicable tool for detecting a
broad class of internet filtering events on a global scale, without the
need to focus on individual countries, and that dynamically adapts
to changing patterns of usage. Countries exhibiting anomalous
behaviour are automatically identified, and can be subjected to
further, more targeted, investigation.
We have validated our approach both by evaluating detection
rates of injected anomalies in a synthetically-generated time series,
and demonstrated that our detection rates are significantly higher
than those used in the existing anomaly detector used by the Tor
project. Additionally, our tool provides useful ranking of anomalies
according to strength, as well as highlighting anomalous periods
rather than single-day events.
We have further evaluated our tool by successfully comparing
detected anomalous periods with an external list of known Tor
blocking events. This evaluation successfully identified each re-
ported blocking event, supporting the tool’s practical effectiveness
in detecting real-world anomalies.
Using our approach, we have demonstrated that combining
anomalies detected in multiple metrics can be an effective means
to identify more targeted forms of anomaly that indicate filtering
behaviour. Our initial combination of opposite-signed normal Tor
usage and bridge node usage anomalies is a key step, but there
are other behaviours that could be of specific interest; there is also
significant potential for further combination with metrics from
other tools and data sources.
Beyond the technique itself, the analyses presented in this work
have identified several states that are known to engage in active
filtering, but have also highlighted patterns of anomalous behaviour
in several states that have not received significant attention from
the internet censorship research community. Conducting more
detailed investigations of these countries is a promising focus for
future research.
Our anomaly detection tool is running actively on a nightly basis,
with results output to a dedicated anomaly mailing list. This list
has an audience amongst NGOs and research projects working in
the field of investigating filtering and circumventing censorship,
and has seen active use in detecting emerging real-world filtering
events.
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In addition to the underlying technique and tool developed to
detect anomalous periods of behaviour, we have suggested, and pro-
vided initial evidence, that the use of the Tor metrics data, amongst
other sources, is of use not only as an indicator of its own usage
patterns, but as a practical proxy variable for a much wider class
of political and social events. This presents significant potential
for researchers, policy makers, and activists investigating global
freedom of expression.
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